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In the Supreme Court
of d1.e State of Utah
GUS P. LEXES, RALPH M. GARNER,
PETER JOHN K AN 0 N and
TH0~1AS L. ANDERSON, Employees of the American Smelting &
Refining Company,
Petitioners,
vs.

Case No. 7623

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Department of Employment Security and AMERICAN
SMELTING & REFINING COMPANY,
Defendants

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
On July 11, 1950, a representative of the Department
of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
issued a decision holding the claimants in this matter to be
ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits
from June 25, 1950, through July 8, 1950.
3
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On July 19, 1950, the Department received an appeal
filed on behalf of the claimants. The appeal was referred to
the Appeals Referee on July 21, 1950, and an appeal hearing
was conducted on August 21, 1950. The Referee upheld the
decision of the representative, and the matter was appealed
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission. The
Board of Review, on the 5th day of December, 1950, issued a
decision upholding the decision of the representative and the
Referee. The matter is now before this court on a Petition
for Review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to June 25, 1950, certain switching was being done
on the premises of the American Smelting & Refining Company, Garfield, Utah, pursuant to a contract with the D & RGW
Railroad. Under the contract railroad employees (members
of the Switchmen's Union of North America) did the switching as employees of the D & RGW.
On June 25, 1950, pursuant to a strike order, members
of the Switchmen's Union of North America who were employed by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (including those at the American Smelting & Refining Plant at
Garfield, Utah) left their work (Tr. 32).
The contract between Local Union No. 4347, United Steel
Workers of America, C.I.O., and American Smelting & Refining Company provided that the union would have jurisdiction over the jobs which were vacated by the striking
switchmen (Tr. 49). Pursuant to the provisions of the con4
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tract, the company and. the union entered into arrangements
whereby on June 26 (Tr. 48) members of Local Union No.
4347 took over such switching work, using equipment furnished by the American Smelting & Refining Company. At
that time the contract wit.~ the D & RG\XT had been cancelled
and there were no positions in the plant operations which
were being filled by railroad employees.
On June 28, 1950, the Switchmen's Union of North
America established pickets at the gates of the plant. At that
time, and immediately prior thereto, the company had been
operating three shifts (Tr. 4), one shift commencing at 7:45
a.m. (the morning shift) , the afternoon shift reporting at 3: 4 5
p.m., and the evening shift reporting at 11 :45 p.m. When
the morning shift reported for work on the morning of June
28, 1950, it encountered the pickets of the Switchmen's Union.
On the 23rd day of June, the Executive Board of Local
Union 4347, United Steel Workers of America, C.I.O., met
and discussed the company's proposal to take over the switchmen's job in event the D & RGW workers left the plant. At
that time the Board agreed that if there was a picket line
established by the Switchmen's Union, the members of Local
No. 4347 would not enter the plan·t (Tr. 17, 18). On or
about the same time one of the officers of the Executive Board
notified the management of the American Smelting & Refining
Company that the members of Local Union No. 4347 would
take over the switching operations formerly done by members
of the Switchmen's Union, but that if a picket line was established, the members of the union would not cross the line
(Tr. 18).

5
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The employees of the American Smelting & Refining Company, upon finding the pickets of the Switchmen's Union,
stayed outside the plant (Tr. 19). A delegation of members
of Local Union No. 4347 (representing (A.S. & R. employees)
was sent into the plant to advise certain A.F. of L. union members who were working on a construction project to get out
and stay out during the existence of the picket lines (Tr. 20).
At about 10:30 a.m., June 28, 1950, the union representatives met with the representatives of management and discussed the existence of the picket line (Tr. 36). At that time
the union advised the management that the men were honoring
the picket line and would not come through, and the union
representatives suggested to the management that the afternoon and night shifts be advised as to the situation and that
the afternoon and night shift workers were not to report
for work. Such a notice appeared on various radios that
afternoon and evening (Tr. 36, 41).
Members of Local Union No. 4347, United Steel Workers
of America (employees of the A.S. & R. Company) worked
with the pickets of the Switchmen's Union in order to point
out which individuals were supervisory employees of the
company and therefore entitled to go through the line (Tr. 44).
The workmen on the afternoon and evening shifts did
not report for work (Tr. 60).
There was no dispute between the Switchmen's Union of
North America and the American Smelting & Refining Company either prior to or at the time the Switchmen's Union
established their picket line at the A.S. & R. property.
6
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE CLAil\1ANTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR
WORK \"X!ITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH
El\fPLOYl\1ENT SfCl TRITY ACT AND WERE THEREFORE INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD COl\1MENCING JUNE 25, 1950, AND ENDING JULY 8,
1950.
II. THE PETITIONERS LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY
\XliTHOUT GOOD CAUSE.
III. THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS WAS
NOT DUE TO THE EMPLOYER'S FAULT.

ARGUMENT
I

THE CLAIMANTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR
WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT AND WERE THEREFORE
INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD COMMENCING
JUNE 25, 1950, AND ENDING JULY 8, 1950.
The Utah Employment Security Act provides, Sec. 422a-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, that to be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week a claimant must make
a claim for benefits for that week, he must register for work,
and he must be able and available for work. The word "avail7
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ability" is generally defined as· being at disposal, accessible,
attainable, ready or handy, and usable. The claimant is considered to be available for work only when he is prepared to
accept at once an offer of any suitable work brought to his
notice. The question of availability usually arises in two types
of situations; one where, by some overt act such as leaving
his usual employment or leaving the general area where his
type of employment is available or assuming obligations extraneous to employment or the like, the claimant has materially
lessened his opportunity of working or has restricted his sphere
of employment; and the other where the claimant has failed
to apply for, or has refused to accept employment. In the
situations of the first type the mental attitude and the intentions of the claimant toward accepting suitable work are an
important test even though he has placed himself in a position
which, viewed objectively, would seem consistent with availability. The acceptance of his customary employment or any
suitable work, of course, constitutes the best evidence of mental
willingness to work.
In the instant case there can be no contention that the
usual work of the claimants at the American Smelting &
Refining properties was not suitable.
The petitioners call the court's attention to Section 422a-5(c) (2), Utah Code Annotated 1943 (Utah Employment
Security Act) which sets up certain standards applying to
offers of new work. That section quoted by the petitioners
provides that new work may not be offered to a claimant if
the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout,
or other labor dispute. The primary· intent of this statutory
8
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provision is to bar a referral of workers which would have
the effect of setting up a system of strike breaking.
In the instant case there was no offer of new work to any
of the clair.1ants. The v;ork which was involved was their
customary usual occupation. As early as June 23, 1950, the
Executive Board of Local Union 4347, United Steel Workers
of America, C.I.O., had determined that its members would
not violate any picket line which might be established by the
Switchmen's Union (Tr. 17, 18). They notified the management on or about that time that if the picket line were established they would not be available for work. On June 28 at
the time the picket line was established the members of the
Executive Board again notified the company that its members
would not cross the picket line and that there would be no
employees available to continue operations.
The situation wherein a non-striking umon refuses to
cross picket lines is not a novel one. The instant case differs
from many others only by virtue of the fact that there was no
strike and no dispute in existence between the Switchmen's
Union of North America and the American Smelting & Refining Company. The strike and the dispute was between the
S~,ritchmen's Union of North America and the Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company. The reason given by the
claimants for failing to cross the picket lines is very well
expressed by one of claimants' witnesses, who, when asked
why union members respected picket lines, replied:
"Well, every union man on joining a union pledges
that he will work for the betterment of organized labor
and that he will not under any circumstances take an9
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other man's job and that he will cease work on the
orders of his union, and there is also a common belief
among organized labor that what hurts one union man
hurts another and to undermine the--for the C.I.O.,
for example, to undermine the A. F. of L. union by
crossing their picket lines and aid in breaking the strike
would undermine all of our rights." (Tr. 39).
In essence, then, the honoring by one union of the picket
lines of another union is an economic weapon which has been
adopted by the entire union movement. This choice of action
on the part of union members does not in any manner or means
change the general purpose of unemployment compensation
laws. These laws are established to accumulate funds by levying
contributions against the employers or payrolls; said funds
to be used for the payment of unemployment compensation to
individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their
own. Unemployment compensation is provided to carry individuals over temporary periods wherein they are unable to
work because of factors beyond their control. The intent of
employment security and unemployment compensation cannot
be changed by reason of possible stigmas or union penalties
which spring from and are inherent in the union movement
and which are subject to change only by the unions themselves.
To hold that the unions could establish rules under which
unemployment compensation would be paid would necessarily
mean that employers or employer groups could also establish
rules under which unemployment compensation would be paid
or denied as the case might be.
.
The right of the union as an organization or the individual
member of the union to recognize picket lines or abide by other
10
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union rules must not be confused with the right of such individuals to unemployment compensation. Voluntary actions in
many instances deny unemployment benefits to individual
workers. They are denied benefits in cases of misconduct in
connection with their work, in cases of voluntary quits, in cases
where they are physically unable to work, and in many other
instances v.rhere the underlying reason for their unemployment
lies in some volitional act on their part.
In Bodinson Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 935, and
101 P. 2d 165, a strike was called by the welders union. The
machinists did not go on strike but refused to cross the picket
line of the welders. The Commission determined that the
machinists were eligible for benefits. The court in holding that
this determination was erroneous stated:
"The weakness of this argument is not in the underlying premises upon which respondents rely, but in its
application to the present case based upon the assumption that the employees who refused to pass the picket
line did not act of their own volition. It is true that
under the proper construction of the statute an employee who is prevented from working through no act
of his own is entitled to compensation, as for example,
where he is barred by force from the premises where he
has been working, but that is not the situation here.
If the picket line was maintained within the limits
permitted by law, as this one presumably was, no
physical compulsion was exerted to prevent corespondents from working. They were unemployed
solely because in accordance with their union principles
they did not choose to work in a plant where certain
of their fellow employees were on strike. Their own
11
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consciences and faith in their union principles dictated
their action. This choice is one which members of organized labor are frequently called upon to make, and
in the eyes of the law this kind of choice has never
been deemed involuntary. This very point was consideL"ed by us in a recent ca:e dealing with the right
of labor unions to picket, wherein the employer sought
an injunction on the ground that the picket line operated as an unlawful compulsion upon other union men.
We said . . . 'It is obviously untrue that when truck
drivers employed by other firms refuse to go through
the picket line, they do so involuntarily. Such refusal
is undobutedly based upon the freely adopted rules of
the local union to which they belong.' Fairly interpreted it was intended to disqualify those workers who
voluntarily leave their work because of a trade dispute.
Co-respondents in this proceeding, 'in fact, left their
work because of a trade dispute and are consequently
ineligible to receive benefit payments."
In the instant case the workers remained away from their
employment solely because of their adherence to the union
principle of honoring picket lines. The defendants do not
question the union principles involved. We do, however, contend that benefits are not payable to claimants whose unemployment is due directly to their voluntarily staying away
from work due to the carrying out of those, principles. We
think it makes little difference whether the picket line is a legal
one or one which constitutes a secondary boycott. In the instant case, the union to which the claimants belonged not only
recognized the picket line, but took an active part in enforcing
the picket line by sending a delegation into the plant to order
certain A. F. of L. construction workers off the property. In

12
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other words, the union was adding its own economic strength
to that of the Switchmen's Union.
In the case of American Brake Shoe Company vs. Frank
Annunzio, Director of Labor, et a], 405 Ill. 44, claimants who
did not cross the picket lines set up by members of a different
union at the company in w~ich they worked were held disqualified from unemployment benefits. In commenting upon
the eligibility of the workers the court said:
"It appears to us from the evidence of the sole witness from the Die Sinkers' Conference that the real
reason for the die sinkers failing to report for work
was that they did not care to be classified as 'scabs.'
Peaceful picketing by employees to gain rights from
employers is recognized as a legal activity, but picketing
coupled with violence is not recognized as a legal activity. In this case it appears that the die sinkers could
have entered their place of employment without sustaining bodily harm, and since this court will not assume that picketing normally will bring violence, therefore it appears to us that the die sinkers voluntarily
remained away from their employment because they
did not care to be classified as 'scabs' by fellow employees. Since the fear of such classification appeared
to be the motivation for their failure to enter their
place of employment, it logically follows that they
were either participating in the labor dispute by failing
to cross the picket line or voluntarily remaining away
from their employment, either of which would disqualify them from compensation benefits. The die
sinkers were unemployed solely because in accordance
with their union principles they did not choose to work
in a plant where certain employees from another plant
of their employer were conducting picketing."

In the case of Local Union No. 222, Oil Workers Inter-

13
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national Union, et al, vs. Robert L. Gordon, Director of Labor,
et al (Illinois Supreme Court, May 18, 1950) 406 Ill. 145,
the production and maintenance workers of Local No. 222
whose place of employment was shut down when a picket line
was set up by employees of another company who were members of the same international union, the court, in holding the
workers ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits
because of the workers' observance of the picket line, said:
"The stoppage in the case at bar resulted from a
conference not between the Texas Company and the
pickets, but between Local 222 and the Texas Company. There is no showing in the case at bar of any
threat of violence . . . In the case of American Brake
Shoe Company vs. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, we held that
employees are ineligible for unemployment compensation where they elect not to cross the picket line established by other employees from another plant of the
same employer who are members of a different labor
union. We held that they must be regarded as either
participating in the labor dispute which caused the
picketing or being voluntarily unemployed because
they did not care to cross the picket line. We cannot see
how the plaintiffs in this case can be any more entitled
to benefits than the plaintiffs in the American Brake
Shoe case because the substance of the termination arrangements of the negotiations merely were that both
the union and the employer understood that Local
Union 222 would respect the picket line and, therefore,
there would be a work stoppage."
In the instant case, as hereinbefore pointed out, the union
had on one or more occasions advised the company that its
members would not cross the picket line and that consequently
the workers on the second and third shifts should be notified
14
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~:

of that situation; in other words, that they were not to report
for work. Naturally, \Yith no workers reporting for work because of unavailability due to their refusal to cross the picket
line, a work stoppage resulted. Had the men presented themselves as be~ng ready and \villing to work, the operations of
the American Smelting and Refining Company would have
continued at the normal pace.
The Indiana Board of Review in Decision No. 48-LDR-6,
4-18-49, quoted at C.C.H. paragraph 8163, holds that members of one union who refuse to cross the picket line established
by another union are ineligible for benefits because they are
voluntarily unemployed and because their unemployment results from the individual act of each claimant in failing to cross
the picket line. The decision holds that the refusal to cross the
picket line is tantamount to an individual act of participation
by each claimant in the labor dispute.
The Oregon Appeals Referee, in case No. 46-RA-144,
March 9, 1946, quoted at C.C.H. paragraph 8059, held that
even though the claimant states that he is not a member of the
striking union and is not involved in the strike, he expresses
interest in the dispute and participation in the dispute which
creates his unemployment by his refusal to cross the picket
line which has been established by workers in the factory at
which he was last employed.
The case of Carl W. Franke vs. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 166 Pa. Super. 251, 70 A. 2d 461
(9950), involved bus drivers who were unemployed duting
a strike of the maintenance workers at the garage where the
15
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buses were kept. The court, in holding the bus drivers ineligible
for unemployment compensation benefits because their unemployment was due to their unwillingness to make a reasonable effort to cross the picket line of the maintenance workers,
said:
"A non-striking employee's refusal to cross a picket
line would be a 'voluntary' suspension of work within
the meaning of Section 402 (d) where the decision was
his own. Phillips, Unemployment Compensation Case,
163 Pa. Super. Court :74, 62 A. 2d 84." (Citing other
cases).
In the matter of Frank H. McGann vs. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379, 62 A.
2d 87, the court held that if a claimant is prevented from peacefully pursuing his employment because of the militant attitude of the picket line, because of incidents of violence, and
because of threats of physical violence, his unemployment
would be involuntary. However, the court said that a mere
statement by a claimant that he refused to cross the picket
line because of fear of bodily harm is not enough to demonstrate that his unemployment was involuntary in a situation
where there was not a single overt act of violence of any
character, leading a reasonable person to believe that he would
be in physical danger in the event he attempted to cross the
picket lines. The strike and picket lines are not always accompanied by violence, intimidation, and physical restraint.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may assume
that picketing is carried on peacefully and within the limits
permitted by law. The court held that there was substantial
and competent evidence supporting the finding that claimants
16
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made no efforts to cross the picket lines, that they were not
actually threatened, and that there was no attempted violence,
and that therefore they were subject to disqualification for
voluntary suspension of work resulting from an industrial
dispute.
In the case of Joseph D. Phillips vs. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 374, 62 A. 2d 84,
the court held that the claimant, a member of a machinists
union, who refused to cross a picket line established by an
office employees' union, was unemployed due to a voluntary
suspension of work resulting from an industrial dispute. The
claimant was not prevented from crossing the picket line, and
his adherence to union principles dictated his decision not to
cross it, and that he had made the strikers' cause his own by
voluntarily suspending his work.
In the case of Joseph P. Stillman et al vs. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 569, 56 A. 2d
380, the court cited with approval the findings of the Board.
These findings are as follows:
"8. After the members of the tool and die makers
union established a picket line at the !vieadville plant,
the other employees who were members of affiliated
unions of the American Federation of Labor failed to
report for work because of their unwillingness to cross
the picket lines. The employer company was at all times
ready and willing to continue operations and would
have been able to do so to a very considerable extent for
some time after the strike by the tool and die makers.
No action was taken by the employer, nor was any
authorized action taken on its behalf, to close the plant
or to afford a basis for reasonable belief on the part

17
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of any employees that the plant had been closed to
them. The failure of the. employees to work was not
in any measure due to the fact that they were prevented
from working. There was no violence, nor were there
any threats. of violence on the picket line. Their failure
and refusal to '.':cr!< was due to (a) their; objectior1s,
based upon principle, to crossing a picket line; and (b)
their unwillingness to risk the consequences which
might be imposed by their unions by reason of crossing
the picket line."
"9. The tool and die makers went out on strike at
the Erie plant on or about November 8, 1945. The
company was also ready, able, and willing to continue
operations at this plant. The suspension at the Erie
plant likewise resulted from the failure or refusal of
the employees to report for work after the strike by
the tool and die makers at that plant. Their failure to
work was based upon their objections in principle or
their apprehension with regard to crossing a picket
line."
See also Miller vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 152 Pa. Super. 315, 321, 31 A. 2d 740.
In the matter of the appeals of employees of the Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Company, decided by the Washington
Supreme Court (Case No. 30668), October 22, 1948, 31 Wash.
659, 198 P 2d 675, the court said:
"Originally, the picket lines were maintained only
by members of the plant union. However, the other
employees (the claimants herein) refused to go through
the picket lines although their jobs were at all times
available to them. There was no violence or forceful
.effort made to .prevent the claimants from working,
but these employees had heard of violence in the east;
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had heard rumors that probably pictures would be taken
of anybody trying to ent~r the buildings; or that they
would be branded as 'scabs.' The telephone operators
testified that they were kept from the job through fear;
some because of their husbands' jobs; some because
they were just a[raid to cross picket lines. Although in
Spokane and Seattle only members of the plant union
maintained the picket lines, in Tacoma toward the
end of the strike some telephone operators also acted
as pickets."
In the case of Phillip Meyer et al vs. Industrial Commission of Missouri, et al, decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, October 18, 1949, C.C.H. 1fo. 8151, machinists who
were unemployed because of a strike by the moulders in the
employer's iron working plant, who refused to cross picket
lines set up by the striking moulders, were disqualified for
unemployment compensation benefits where their refusal to
cross the picket lines was voluntary in that in the absence of
proof to the contrary it is to be presumed that the picket lines
were maintained and conducted in an orderly manner and
there was no threat of bodily harm. The court said:
"It seems to stand without dispute that one who
voluntarily refused to cross the picket line to go to his
work is participating in the work stoppage. This is true
regardless of the fact that he may not profit by the
strike since by refusing to work he has added his
strength to the cause of the strikers and placed them
in a better bargaining position.
"The question for determination here is whether
or not the refusal to cross the picket line was voluntary
in view of the conduct of the pickets and by reason of
testimony of the witnesses that they were afraid to
cross the line. Generally a voluntary act is an act of
19
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one's own choice and the motives that cause the choice
to be made do not enter into the question. Such a conception of the word 'voluntary,' however, presupposes
freedom to choose a course of action, and so in determining whether or not the refusal to cross the line
was a. voluntary ::trt, 've must decide whether there was
any restra~nt that prevented the workers from doing so.
Such restraint might be actual physical restraint, or it
might be such conduct on the part of the pickets as to
reasonably give rise to a fear of bodliy injury."
The several state unemployment compensation laws are
patterned upon the provisions of the British and Canadian acts.
We cite two decisions of the Canadian Umpire dealing with
unemployment compensation insurance and with the eligibility
of workers who refused to cross picket lines. In Case No.
CUB-287, decided September 10, 1947, and published in the
Selected Decisions of Umpire, 1943~1948, the facts and holding
were as follows: The claimant, a carpenter and member of
a union, hereinafter· referred to as "Union A," lost his employment by reason of a stoppage of work which occurred as
a result of a labor--dispute between the employer and the hod
carriers employed on the project, who were members of a
union to which the claimant did not belong and which will be
referred to as "Union B." He made a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits contending that he was not participating in, financing or directly interested in the labor dispute but
that he, as a member of Union A, was obligated under penalty
of a fine authorized by the constitution of the parent body to
respect the picket line set up by Union B, which had the same
affiliation. He was disqualified for the period of the work
stoppage.
20
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In Case No. CUB-320, decided February 5, 1948, and
published in Selected Decisions of the Umpire, 1943-1948, by
the Unemployment Insurance Commission of Canada, a claimant, a union member, who stated that he was not available for
work because of the existence of a strike at his last place of
employment was not available on the day on which he made
he made his claim for benefits, and that due to a continuation
of the strike, he continued to be not available for work.
In the instant case, while there was no statement on the
part of the claimants that they were not available for work,
the record shows that they were not available for the principal
and usual work for which they were best fitted.
This court in Members of the Iron Workers of Provo,
Utah, (Employees of Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company)
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 139 P. 2d 208, in
discussing the failure of claimants to report for work because
of a picket line, cited with favor the case of Bodinson Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment Commission,
supra, stating that:
"The Supreme Court of California held that if the
applicant was not physically prevented from working,
but he merely exercised the choice of following union
principles by not going through the picket line, he was
not out of work involuntarily and he was not eligible
for unemployment compensation."
This court also referred to the case of In Re Persons Employed, etc., 7 Wash. 2d 580, 110 P. 2d 877, in which the
court held that inasmuch as members of the union which did
not call a strike agreed not to go through a picket line estab21
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lished by other unions, they were thereby participating in a
labor dispute and that there was no need for determining
whether or not the applicants were of the same "class" of
workers as the strikers or whether they were employed in a
separate unit of the company.
In the instant case, we do not, of course, have a labor dispute existing between the company and the picketing workers
or the company employees; however, the same principle is
involved.
Insofar as the unions are concerned, ··in unity there is
strength," and the overall aims of union negotiations are furthered by a full and complete cooperation regarding the recognition of pickets. Regardless of how laudable these union
principles might be, they cannot be construed as controlling
the matter of the eligibility of affected individuals for unemployment compensation benefits. We find several court cases
involving the question of whether or not the intent and the
provisions of the act rather than rules established by unions
or employers, or both, are controlling in determining who
shall receive unemployment benefits. In Levinson vs. UCC
Circuit Court, Jasper County, Missouri, No. 47785, decided
December 14, 1942, the Missouri Court held that a claimant
who was discharged for failure to join a union with which
his employer had entered closed shop contract was eligible
for unemploymentcompensation benefits. The court said:
"It is the opinion of the court that an employee
who is performing satisfactory work and who is discharged or required to quit for refusal to join a union
cannot be considered as having separated from his
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work voluntarily without good cause or had been separated from work for misconduct connected with work,
and such employee is therefore eligible for benefits
under the unemployment compensation law."
In the case of Prince vs. Schick, Inc., Super. Ct., Fairfield
County, Connecticut, No. 75665, August 27, 1948; C.C.H.,
U.I. Rep., Volume II, page 10, 583, it was held:
.. In reality there is no connection between the contract
obligation assumed by the defendant employer to discharge any of his employees suspended or expelled by
the union and the plaintiff's rights under the unemployment compensation act. Obviously, too, there is no
identity or mutual dependency between plaintiff's obligations to his union as a member thereof and his
right to the bounty of the state as conferred by the
unemployment compensation act. Of course, too, the
defendant employer and the union to which he belonged could not agree together to a course of action
which would, in effect, enlarge the scope of the law
insofar as the disqualification due to 'willful misconduct' beyond that sanctioned by the legislative intention is concerned.''
·
To hold that the rights of employees to unemployment
compensation under the Utah Employment Security Act can
be determined by a decision of the employer or a decision of
the union, would raise serious constitutional questions. It is
questionable whether it could be said that due process of law
has been granted to an employee whose claim for benefits has
been denied on grounds of union rule or employer rule. It is
also questionable whether the Legislature or the Commission
could so delegate the function of determining claimant's rights.
To hold that an employer rule or a union rule or principle is
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controlling, would be to constitute the employer or the union
as sole judge of eligibility. In such a case it would be necessary
to include in the findings of the representative the local union's
constitution and by-laws as well as those of the parent organization, together with a detailed and comprehensive statement
of the union rule or principles involved.
Again, we reiterate that the right to unemployment compensation benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act
must not be confused with the right of the individual worker
to fulfill his obligations to the union movement by voluntarily
honoring picket lines and by otherwise participating in disputes.
Benefits under the Employment Security Act were definitely
not intended to be available to underwrite actions of either
employers or unions in their exercise of economic pressure
moves.

II

THE PETITIONERS LEFT WORK VOLUNTARILY
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.
We feel that the question of the claimants' leaving work
voluntarily has been properly answered in the argument under
Point I. As was pointed out, they certainly voluntarily deprived the employer of their services unless it is determined
that union rules and principles supersede the intent of the
legislative act and that in following those union rules or
principles the claimants were not exercising their own volition.
The claimants were represented by their union, and the union,
acting as agent for the claimants, had voted (prior to the estab24
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lishment of the picket line) to honor the picket lines established by the Switchmen's Union of North America.

III
THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS WAS
NOT DUE TO THE EMPLOYER'S FAULT.
The contention of petitioners that the inability of petitioners to gain access to their place of work was attributable to
their employer because the employer failed to take steps to
remove what the management felt was a secondary boycott
appears rather inconsistent in view of the union's own actions.
Prior to the establishment of the picket line, the union Executive Board, being in full possession of all of the facts which
were possessed by the company management, had voted to
recognize the picket line. It must have been as obvious to the
union on the 23rd day of June, when such action was formulated by the union, as it was to the management of the company
on the 28th day of June, that there was no dispute existing
between the company and the members of the Switchmen's
Union of North America. The union knew at least by June
25 that there were not even any positions on the premises of the
company which were being filled by railroad employees.
If the company knew that the picketing constituted a
secondary boycott within the definitions of the State of Utah,
then the union officers also knew. Knowing this the union
voted to recognize the picketing by the Switchmen's Union
and in effect to lend its support to the demands of that union.
25
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Certainly all that the company did, from a practical standpoint, was to recognize the practical situation existing by reason
of the union's announcement that its members would not cross
the picket line. The unemployment of the claimants resulted
directly from their decision to follow their union principles,
and not from any action taken by the company. From the
standpoint of the members, their decision was a sound one;
from the standpoint of their being eligible to receive unemployment compensation during the period they were so unemployed, the soundness of their action in following union
principles cannot be the controlling factor.
We respectfully submit that the claimants, by reason of
their voluntary action in withholding their services from their
regular employer, the American Smelting & Refining Company,
thereby made themselves unavailable for work within the
meaning of the Act and are therefore ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. When an individual's usual
wages, working conditions, etc., have not changed as regards
his regular and current employer, such employment cannot
be deemed otherwise than suitable, and the individual worker
must make himself available to the employer to perform required services.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN, Special
Assistant Attorney General

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

